US-Pakistan Relations Since 2009:'Do More' Versus 'No More' Deadlock in Afghanistan

The relationship between the US and Pakistan is facing a serious crisis as the trust deficit between them has increased. Ties between the two are overwhelmingly dependent on Pakistan's ability to cooperate in ending the jihadist terrorism and helping the US stabilize the war-torn Afghanistan. The US continues to accuse Pakistan of not doing enough to counter various terrorist groups operating from its soil, while raising fundamental questions over Islamabad's commitment to countering Islamist extremism. On the other hand, Pakistan accuses the US of disregarding its huge sacrifices in the fight against terrorism, while maintaining that it has done more than enough. The paper tries to examine the nature and dimension of US-Pakistan relations since 2009 against the backdrop of the ongoing war against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

Introduction
The US-Pakistan relationship has been a unique, complex and abnormal one. What has been a significant factor in the US-Pakistan relations is that American policy towards Pakistan has fluctuated in response to several global and regional geopolitical changes. The US has followed both engagement and containment policies, termed as carrots and sticks respectively, towards Pakistan.

Pakistan's foreign policy has been historically shaped by the structural determinants of being a major US ally, a fact that has often raised its strategic profile. Its unique geographic location, huge population, nuclear arsenal and world's sixth-largest army, and standing in the Muslim world have given Pakistan a substantial diplomatic and strategic heft. With its capacity further enhanced by the US patronage, the Pakistan army has become a dominant player in the nation's political life. The US has hired Pakistan's leadership from time to time for the advancement of its strategic interests, and in exchange for its crucial support, Pakistan's ruling elite has hired Washington for military aid and economic assistance to bankroll undemocratic and unaccountable governance.

From the very beginning, the US-Pakistan relationship was built upon shaky and dubious foundation. Pakistani diplomats successfully deceived American policymakers into forging an anti-communist alliance. However, as former Pakistani ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, has demonstrated, the primary Pakistani motivation for drawing the US into South Asia was to balance India's military power.¹ Pakistan joined the West-sponsored military alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), becoming the 'most allied ally of the US'.

Despite the fundamental mismatch of mutual expectations, the US-Pakistan alliance served both sides well in the initial years of the Cold War. Islamabad succeeded in getting enormous quantity of US assistance for military and economic purposes. America's diplomatic support on the contentious issue of Kashmir was the icing on the cake for Pakistan. In turn, the US acquired access to vital military bases in Pakistan, from which it could carry out aerial surveillance of critical areas of the USSR. However, the relationship, which became cliental and increasingly transactional, witnessed downturn when the US refused Pakistan's request to provide military assistance in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Despite the fact that the US withheld military supplies to both India and Pakistan during the war, Pakistani politicians cried betrayal and whipped up public frenzy against the US. In the wake of the 1971

Indo-Pak war, the US once again failed to bail out Pakistan. Although the Nixon administration demonstrated remarkable tilt towards Pakistan, nothing substantial was done by the US to prevent Pakistan's dismemberment into two parts. Although it is a well-known fact that the most important reason for which Pakistan had joined the US camp was to counter India, Pakistan's so-called grudge against the US for not supporting Pakistan against India in 1965 and 1971 is misplaced. It must not be forgotten that the US treaty obligations to Pakistan were essentially in the context of Communist threat to Pakistan's security. As Pakistan faced no such threat in either 1965 or 1971, the US did not feel obliged to come to Pakistan's help.

Notwithstanding the distrust, cooperation again became the dominant theme in the backdrop of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US considered the Soviet invasion as further expansion of the communist influence in the region. The strategy to use the mujahideen to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan was originally devised by the Pakistani dictator, General Zia ul Haq, and later sold to the US. The US-Pakistan alliance during this phase undoubtedly helped Washington win the Cold War but under the shadow of sinister forces of Islamist radicalism that would later come to haunt the entire world. Following the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the sole superpower, resulting in another shift in the US policy. This affected Pakistan as well, which no longer remained a strategic frontline state of the US. Washington started mounting pressure on Pakistan on nuclear and missile issues as well. The US coming out in support of India during the Kargil war in 1999 and the five day-visit of President Clinton to India in March 2000 clearly underlined the shift in American policy.

The War on Terrorism
The US-Pakistan relations were at an all-time low when a group of terrorists belonging to the Al Qaeda masterminded a jihadist attack on the US on September 11, 2001. This incident brought the US and Pakistan together to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. But this time, the US did not request Pakistan for help; instead Pakistan was 'asked' to cooperate in the global war on terrorism. Sensing the gravity of situation, Pakistan's army chief and ruler, General Pervez Musharraf immediately agreed to extend full cooperation to the US. For Musharraf, the first priority was to secure Pakistan's strategic assets because he feared that if Pakistan did not cooperate, the US would retaliate. Another important factor that helped him side with the US was to use the cooperation as a tool to end Pakistan's isolation in the international arena. And most importantly, it was feared that Pakistan army's interests in Kashmir would be in danger if the US was not supported in its war efforts in Afghanistan.

As Pakistan joined the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, close ties between Washington and Islamabad began to develop again. Due to its geostrategic location, Pakistan became irreplaceable for logistical support to the US and NATO forces in fighting terrorists. Pakistan provided vital military support to the US, opening its airspace and ground lines of supply to American forces in Afghanistan and giving access to numerous military bases in Pakistan. Islamabad began intelligence cooperation with Washington in the hunt for Al Qaeda operatives, although very few steps were taken by Pakistan to disown its former Taliban proxies in Afghanistan.

However, the process of establishing close ties between the two countries began to encounter roadblocks as Pakistan's duplicity in the war on terror started to unfold. Gradually, the US started asking uncomfortable questions regarding Pakistan's commitment to the war on terror. American officials complained that Pakistani forces had not been aggressive enough in curbing the movement of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan was also criticized for not persisting with attacks on terrorists within Pakistan. The US was not happy with the intelligence cooperation from Pakistani agencies either. Fears were expressed in higher government circles in Washington that some elements within the Pakistan government were trying to undermine the war on terror by tipping off about impending US attacks on terrorists. Another reason for America's unhappiness was that the Pakistan government had not shown earnestness in curbing the anti-American feeling in the country. The US officials also expressed their concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program and possible access of terrorist groups to nuclear weapons in the country. On the other hand, Pakistan government was upset with the US over not recognizing its contribution to the war on terror. The US military actions inside Pakistan were also criticized in public by high-ranking Pakistani leaders. Furthermore, Pakistan let the US be in the know that India's growing developmental presence in Afghanistan was strongly disliked by Islamabad.

The Obama Administration
New Policy
One of the key conclusions that Obama made at the beginning of his first term was that Afghanistan and Pakistan needed to be seen together and that linkage was critical to understand that Afghan problem could not be solved in isolation. The US spent tremendous amount of resources to help Pakistan and influence its behavior. In March 2009, President Barak Obama declared a new Af-Pak policy whose aim was "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."² The Obama administration recognized that the conflict in Afghanistan could not be resolved without addressing the sources of terrorism in Pakistan. Describing the Afghan situation as "increasingly perilous" and lamenting the fact that "insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan" and that attacks against "our NATO allies, and the Afghan government have risen steadily", Obama clarified that the "future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan", whose border regions were used by Al Qaeda "as a safe-haven to hide, train terrorists, communicate with followers, plot attacks, and send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan." He cautioned that "intelligence estimates have warned that Al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the US homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan."³

Emphasizing the need to assist Pakistan, Obama said that "US has great respect for the Pakistani people [who] want the same things that we want: an end to terror, access to basic services, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the security that can only come with the rule of law. The single greatest threat to that future comes from Al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and that is why we must stand together Make no mistake: Al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within."⁴

In order to help Pakistan fight against terrorists, Obama declared that the US would provide military assistance, training and support to the Pakistan army. He requested the US Congress to pass a bipartisan Kerry-Lugar bill that authorized $1.5 bn in direct support to Pakistan each year over the next five years for infrastructure development and to bring stability to places plagued by violence and to strengthen its democratic institutions. Despite his willingness to help Pakistan economically, Obama clearly told Pakistan that gone were the days when blank cheques were given.

Obama also made another far-reaching policy announcement. On account of the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke was appointed as special representative of the US to Afghanistan and Pakistan to integrate civilian and military efforts. Holbrooke, who occupied a special place in the US foreign policy across every Democratic administration, was a larger-than-life diplomat who had dealt with a wide range of foreign policy issues, particularly known for brokering the Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia.

The Pakistani military's large-scale domestic air and ground operations were noted as remarkable. The ground offensives launched in 2009 invited fulsome praise from the US and other Western observers. It seemed that there was national consensus on anti-terrorism operations in Pakistan. The lawless areas of Waziristan were largely brought under government control. The killing of Baitullah Mehsud, chief of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in a US-launched missile strike in August 2009, was a significant psychological boost for the morale of Pakistani forces. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and Pakistan's foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, held the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in Washington in March 2010. The US acknowledged the contribution of Pakistan in the war against terrorism, and assured help on a wide range of issues.

Unending Mistrust
Despite some positive developments, the enduring mistrust between Washington and Islamabad continued to affect the bilateral relationship. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, popularly known as Kerry-Lugar legislation, which was passed after much debate and controversy, underscored the contrasting viewpoints over the US-Pakistan relationship. The Act required that any security assistance to Pakistan, including arms sales, would be linked to the US Secretary of State's certification that Pakistan was assisting American efforts to "dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear-weapons materials" and was "making significant efforts toward combating terrorists groups." Despite the lenient and democratic nature of restrictions placed on the sizable increase in non-military assistance, at the time of the Act's passage Pakistan's security establishment reacted unusually sharply; the main reason was Pakistan army's unease with the language as Rawalpindi saw the Act interfering with its supremacy in Pakistan's national security policymaking. What made Pakistani generals particularly angry was the mention of Quetta and Muridke, the bases of Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba respectively.⁵ In order to placate Pakistan army's concerns, the explanatory note attached to the final Act noted that "There is no intent to, and nothing in this act in any way suggests that there should be, any US role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military."⁶

The Secretary of State Clinton told in April 2009 that "Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists." After protests from Pakistan, she had to modify her tone, saying that there was an "increasing awareness" of the threat within government circles."⁷ President Obama himself could not prevent himself from expressing "grave concern" over the security situation in Pakistan and candidly remarked that the civilian government did not seem to have the capacity to deliver basic services to the people of Pakistan. The arrest of David Coleman Headley in 2009 gave a jolt to the already stressed relationship. It had been accepted for a long time that there were certain elements within Pakistan's military that were sympathetic to jihadist ideology and organizations, but available evidence was always brushed aside by Washington as lacking in reliability. Headley's case played an important role in removing many doubts about Pakistan's double game. Headley's interrogation brought to light the fact that he had undertaken journeys to Mumbai five times from 2006 to 2008 in preparation for one of the world's deadliest terrorist acts-the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai-by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Headley, the son of a Pakistani father and an American mother, was chosen for the deadly mission because he looked like a non-Muslim westerner. Headley, who gave specific evidence about his close links with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and LeT, subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges.⁸ But what became a breaking point in an already turbulent relationship was the case of Raymond Davis, who was arrested in Pakistan for killing two Pakistanis in Lahore on January 27, 2011. Davis was a former US Special Forces soldier, who had been contracted by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to collect intelligence on the Pakistani military. After 10 years of war in Afghanistan, and a growing divergence in goals, mutual mistrust had reached the point where the CIA was conducting unilateral operations inside Pakistan which were aimed at uncovering ISI's links with jihadist elements. The US diplomats insisted that since Davis enjoyed diplomatic immunity, he must be released, but the Pakistani side refused, arguing that Davis had not been declared as an accredited diplomat.⁹ After days of tussle, the US could secure the release of Davis by paying $2.4 mn to the families of the victims. As a result of this development, the ISI restricted intelligence cooperation with the CIA.¹⁰

Controversial Drone Attacks
The issue of drone attacks emerged as one of the biggest sources of friction between the US and Pakistan. The Obama administration resorted to drone attacks for flushing out terrorists from the remote and tribal areas. In pursuance of a 'light footprint strategy', Obama preferred drone attacks in Pakistan particularly because it allowed the US to retain its military superiority "without resorting to the lengthy, expensive, and unpopular wars and occupations that dominated the past decade" and also because they were "far cheaper than landing troops in remote deserts and mountains."¹¹ Though the drone attacks were successful in eliminating a large number of Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists, death of several Pakistani civilians generated extreme public outrage against the US military. The attacks have also been projected as a violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty.¹² For instance, reacting to the killing of more than 40 people in a drone strike in March 2011 in North Waziristan region close to the Afghan border, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry termed the US action as "flagrant violation of all humanitarian rules and norms." It was also decided by Pakistan to boycott a US-proposed trilateral meeting of representatives from the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan in Brussels.¹³

Despite their public denunciations, there is evidence which supports the fact that the drone strikes are done at the behest of the Pakistani military. Explaining the modus operandi behind Pakistan's undisclosed approval for the drone strikes, Christine Fair has argued:¹⁴

The Americans "are actually targeting Pakistani terrorists because the Pakistanis can't kill them at all or without massive civilian casualties. And then, of course, in keeping the Pakistani role in the drones program secret, we're basically allowing the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies to use us as a scapegoat. The Pakistani military doesn't want to admit that they can't kill these terrorists on their own. The military runs the country based on the claim that it's the most suitable organization to protect the country's interests. Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, does not want this to become public so the organization insists that the US hide their role in the despised drone program. The Pakistanis are very happy when a drone operation goes well, but when something goes wrong [such as civilian deaths], they pin all the blame on the Americans."

The gap between the US and Pakistan further widened after the killing of the Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad by the US Special Forces in May 2011. Though the Pakistani government expressed delight over the killing of bin Laden, it criticized Washington for violating the sovereignty of Pakistan. It became a matter of immense humiliation for the Pakistani military as the world's most wanted terrorist had been living for five years in Abbottabad, a small city about one hour journey from Islamabad and home to Pakistan's premier military academy. One Pakistani journalist, Cyril Almeida, rightly observed: "If we didn't know, we are a failed state. If we did know, we are a rogue state."¹⁵ The commitment of Pakistan to fight terrorism was widely questioned in the US.

According to the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, at the first meeting of the National Security Council to review the CIA's new intelligence regarding bin Laden, the question was raised about sharing the intelligence with Pakistan. Clinton writes that "I and others thought we could not trust Pakistan I also knew elements in the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, maintained ties to the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremists." The US decision not to inform Pakistan was extraordinary. Although the US had provided Pakistan with huge economic and military assistance, at the most crucial moment, however, the US President and the Secretary of State decided that they could not trust the ISI with information on the location of bin Laden.

Similarly, Robert Gates, the US Defense Secretary during 2006 to 2011, has depicted a dismal picture of the US-Pakistan relationship. While the US was focused on fighting the terrorists, the Pakistanis wanted to retain their influence in Afghanistan at any cost. Gates writes that "Although I would defend them [Pakistan] in front of Congress and to the press to keep the relationship from getting worse-and endangering our supply line from Karachi-I knew they were really no ally at all." Regarding the May 2011 Abbottabad raid that led to the killing of bin Laden, Gates says that when the operation was being planned he was worried that the ISI was aware of bin Laden's whereabouts: "I worried that Pakistani ISI was aware of where bin Laden was and that there might be rings of security around the compound that we knew nothing about or, at minimum, that ISI might have more eyes on the compound than we could know."¹⁶ Ahead of the raid no one in the Obama administration thought about seeking Pakistani help in killing bin Laden. Gates further writes that "No one thought we should ask the Pakistanis for help or permission. In every instance when we had provided a heads-up to the Pakistan military or intelligence services, the target was forewarned and fled, or the Pakistanis went after the target unilaterally, prematurely and unsuccessfully."¹⁷

Although bin Laden's killing was a big achievement, it did not represent the death of Al Qaeda, either as an organization or ideology. Moreover, the nature of the covert operation, undertaken without cooperation with Pakistan's government or military, clearly exposed the long-standing duplicity of Pakistan. The Pentagon released a report in October 2014 that directly denounced Pakistan for its use of terrorist proxies against India and Afghanistan. The report acknowledged Pakistan's role as an inhibitor for stability in Afghanistan, while praising India's constructive role in aiding Afghan reconstruction:¹⁸

Afghan- and Indian-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India's superior military. These relationships run counter to Pakistan's public commitment to support Afghan-led reconciliation. Such groups continue to act as the primary irritant in Afghan Pakistan bilateral relations. Pakistan's government has sought to increase engagement with Afghanistan. However, suspicion has surrounded the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad, inhibiting bilateral cooperation on border security protocols Although stability in Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan, Pakistan also seeks sufficient Pashtun representation in the Afghan government to prevent Pashtun discontent along the Afghan-Pakistan border and limit India's influence.

The report also implied that the timing of a terror attack on the Indian consulate in Herat by the LeT was linked to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's swearing in. As expected, Pakistan reacted vehemently against the findings of this report. The Pakistan Foreign Office noted that "the Government of Pakistan takes serious exception to comments contained in the US Department of Defense report" that "carries unsubstantiated allegations of the existence of terrorist 'sanctuaries' or that proxy forces are operating from here against Afghanistan and India. Such allegations are of particular concern at this point when Pakistan government has launched comprehensive operations against militants in North Waziristan."¹⁹

Haqqani Network
The US has long maintained that Pakistan's intelligence agency supports the Haqqani network, which is based in Pakistan's tribal areas, as a way to extend Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. Just before he was due to retire, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that Pakistan's ISI had links to the Haqqani network. Mullen made it clear that he believed that Pakistan's support extended to increasingly high-profile attacks in Afghanistan aimed directly at the US. He said: "With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy." Most scathing was the remark that "the Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's ISI agency."²⁰ In fact, Mullen was giving voice to what everyone in the US knew but refused to say it openly. These comments were seen as deliberate effort by Obama administration to put more pressure on Pakistan and pave the way for more drone strikes into Pakistan to root out insurgents from their safe havens.²¹ Mullen's was the most serious charge that the US had leveled against Pakistan in the decade since the war on terror began in 2001. His remarks were certain to strain America's shaky relationship with Pakistan. The response of Pakistan was equally predictable. It claimed that Pakistan was fighting a common enemy in terrorism.

Pakistan faced a great tragedy on December 16, 2014 when terrorists of Pakistani Taliban attacked an army school in Peshawar, killing about 150 persons, mostly children. The Pakistani Taliban asserted that it had attacked the school in retaliation for casualties caused by army operations. This gruesome incident rattled Pakistanis like never before. In the wake of the school massacre, the Pakistani government asserted that "there will be no differentiation between 'good' and 'bad' Taliban". Pakistan's acknowledgment that terrorists can be "good" as well as "bad" was a frank admission about what its real position has been on the sponsorship of extremist organizations.²² The US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Pakistan in January 2015. Speaking at a press conference with Sartaj Aziz, the Pakistani prime minister's adviser on foreign affairs, Kerry praised Pakistan army's operation against Islamist terrorists.²³ But Kerry also said that the US has "been very clear with the highest levels of the Government of Pakistan that Pakistan has to target all militant groups, the Haqqani network and others, which target US coalition and Afghan forces and people in Pakistan and elsewhere."²⁴

In November 2014, Sartaj Aziz was asked during an interview, "Why should America's enemies unnecessarily become our enemies?" He replied, "When the US attacked Afghanistan, all those that were trained and armed were pushed towards us. Some of them were dangerous for us and some are not. Why must we make enemies out of them all?"²⁵ Aziz was referring to the Haqqani network. He also said that the Afghan Taliban was Afghanistan's problem and Haqqani network was a part of it. But soon after when Kerry pressed for action against the Taliban-linked Haqqani network, Pakistan government declared that it had banned the Haqqani network.²⁶ One of the primary reasons to ban the Haqqani network was to show to the international community that Pakistan was pursuing a comprehensive strategy in countering terrorism. Besides, Pakistan also wanted to convince Washington that it was serious this time against the terrorists. However, it was unrealistic to expect the Pakistan army to attempt to dismantle all facets of Pakistan's hydra-headed terror infrastructure. Pakistan had banned many terrorist groups in the past but they reemerged following renaming themselves and continued to operate with impunity.

In April 2016, when the headquarters of an Afghan security agency in Kabul was attacked, the Afghan government accused Pakistan of supporting Islamic terrorists. The terrorist attack near the US embassy and government ministries on April 19, 2016 had killed around 70 people and wounded more than 300. Kabul's police chief told the media that the terror attack was planned by the Haqqani network.²⁷ The Afghan president's spokesperson told that "Any attack the Haqqani group conducts is not possible without Pakistan's help and this has been repeatedly proven in the last 14 years." The Ghani government's claim was endorsed by the US State Department. The State Department spokeswoman told a news briefing that "We have consistently expressed our concerns at the highest level of the government of Pakistan about their continued tolerance for Afghan Taliban groups such as the Haqqani network operating from Pakistani soil. And we did again-after this week's attack, we have pressed the Pakistani government to follow up on its expressed commitment not to discriminate between terror groups regardless of their agenda or their affiliation by undertaking concrete action against the Haqqanis."²⁸

Growing Distance
In January 2015, President Obama made his second visit to the South Asia region. Although he went to India, the omission of Pakistan from his visit caused much heartburn in Pakistan. Although Pakistan's foreign office tried its best to ensure that Obama would visit Pakistan, its efforts proved unsuccessful. Obama told Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a phone call about his upcoming visit to India, and that he would visit Pakistan when the security situation there became normalized. In his final State of the Union address in January 2016, President Obama said that instability would continue for decades in many parts of the world. He declared that "our foreign policy must be focused on the threat from ISIL and Al Qaeda, but it cannot stop there. For even without ISIL, instability will continue for decades in many parts of the world-in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in parts of Central America, Africa and Asia."²⁹ Sartaz Aziz said that Obama's statements about instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan were "his predictions and have nothing to do with ground realities." He defended Pakistan by claiming that Islamabad was "taking decisive action against terrorism and militancy."³⁰

Despite Obama administration's efforts to improve US-Pakistan relations, Pakistan continued to focus on its goals in Afghanistan. As noted in the Pentagon's report in November 2016, "Afghan-oriented militant groups, including Taliban and Haqqani network senior leadership, retain freedom of action from safe havens inside Pakistani territory. The US continues to be clear with Pakistan about steps it should take to improve the security environment and deny safe havens to terrorist and extremist groups." The report also noted that Pakistan failed to disrupt Haqqani network in its territory.³¹ This clearly indicated that nothing much had improved as far as Pakistan's attitude toward Afghanistan was concerned.

Obama announced, against the preferences of the military leadership, in June 2011, that 33,000 US troops would be withdrawn by September 2012; 10,000 of whom would leave before the end of 2011. The expectation was that a complete withdrawal and transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces would be complete by the end of 2014. When Senator John McCain asked during a congressional testimony whether US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, James F Dobbins, endorsed a deadline for withdrawing the US troops by the end of 2016, his reply was elusive as he said that "My view is, on these kinds of situations, that more is better. More time, more money, more troops, more people yields better results."³² Clearly, setting the deadline was not the right strategy as it played into the enemy's hands.

Obama's presidency witnessed the situation in Afghanistan become ever grimmer. Despite changes of military leadership and a visible shift from a counter-terrorism approach to a hybrid counter-insurgency approach, the Afghan war remained unresolved during Obama's tenure. In fact, the fighting became more intense and the Taliban grew more powerful in Afghanistan. Despite extensive internal deliberations, innovative diplomatic efforts, and occasional threats to Pakistan army, Washington's 'Af-Pak' dilemma remained a serious issue with deeply disturbing implications.

While Islamabad continued to claim that it had prioritized the fight against the Taliban, there was undeniable evidence of Pakistan assisting the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. The ISI was continuing to help Lashkar-e-Taiba and other India-centric terror organizations. Conflict with India remained Islamabad's most urgent geopolitical priority and the need to maintain 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan continued to guide Pakistan's policy. Pakistan continued to play a double game with Washington, regardless of the individual occupying the White House. Lacking incentives to induce Pakistan's compliance, Washington under Obama remained effectively in a state of strategic and tactical confusion. Obama was exasperated but unwilling to abandon Pakistan. He too followed the conventional American tendency: The Pakistanis are lying, but give them the weapons and money anyway.

The Trump Administration
Given Afghanistan's poor state capacity, endless political squabbles and the intensity of the Taliban insurgency, the open-ended conflict with the Taliban and America's prolonged financial commitment to Afghanistan has become suspect.³³ The two vital US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan-ensuring terrorists do not have the capacity to attack the US homeland, and keeping terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear material-would continue to guide American policy under the administration of President Donald Trump. But it is Pakistan's counterterrorism conduct that poses a serious challenge for the Trump administration. This challenge is most immediately felt in Afghanistan. Trump has inherited a more challenging situation in Afghanistan than his predecessor did in 2009. The US Defense Secretary James Mattis was outspoken when he told a Congressional hearing in June 2017 that "We are not winning in Afghanistan."³⁴

Afghanistan faces a volatile convergence of political instability, institutional weakness, and endemic conflict. The Taliban has increased its control of territory in the rural areas of Afghanistan's east and north. The Taliban's leadership continues to enjoy a sanctuary in Pakistan, where it oversees the insurgency. Moscow has been ingratiating itself to Islamabad in the hope that a spillover of Taliban's radical influence into Russia's southern provinces can be prevented. Beijing has inveigled itself into several multilateral peace processes, including a trilateral Russia-Afghanistan-China dialogue.

When the US President-elect Donald Trump had made an early telephonic call to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in which Trump was reported by Pakistani media to have showered extravagant praise on Sharif and the Pakistani people, it seemed that under his administration, the US would also adopt a strategy heavy on "carrots". The effusive language of the conversation was more bewildering as the relations between the two countries were tense; the major sticking points included the US demands for the release of Shakil Afridi, a doctor who helped lead the CIA to the hiding place of bin Laden, the withholding of $300 mn in reimbursements to the Pakistani army and the holding up of a deal that would have allowed Pakistan to purchase F-16 fighter jets from the US. The statement by the government's Press Information Department said: "President Trump said Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif you have a very good reputation. You are a terrific guy. You are doing amazing work which is visible in every way. I am looking forward to see you soon. As I am talking to you Prime Minister, I feel I am talking to a person I have known for long. Your country is amazing with tremendous opportunities. Pakistanis are one of the most intelligent people. I am ready and willing to play any role that you want me to play to address and find solutions to the outstanding problems. It will be an honor and I will personally do it."³⁵ However, subsequent developments seemed to move in the direction of "sticks".

While some senior Trump administration officials have come to the conclusion that Pakistan cannot be trusted as an ally in the fight against terrorism, others have emphasized that the US should not risk a full break in relations with Pakistan. However, the dominant feeling is that without more pressure on Pakistan, additional troop deployments in Afghanistan would not meet their ultimate objective: to pressure the Taliban to eventually negotiate peace.

A Tougher Line
Many of the recent initiatives of the Trump administration are intended to force the Pakistani military to make a clear choice between backing the US that finances much of its military operations and continuing to provide secret support for the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network fighting American and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Consequently, the Trump administration has not provided Pakistan with the leverage to insist on substantial military and non-military aid. President Trump has not shown any willingness to listen to unconvincing arguments about good terrorists and bad terrorists.

In May 2017, President Trump during his address at the Arab-Islamic-US summit in Riyadh remarked that "every country in the region has an absolute duty to ensure that terrorists find no sanctuary on their soil". This was a clear reflection of Trump's annoyance with Pakistan's policy of providing shelter to terrorists. One of the key points of Trump's speech that infuriated many Pakistani commentators was the fact that he mentioned India as one of the countries which had suffered due to terrorism, ignoring Pakistan army's contribution in fighting jihadist terror. Trump said: "The nations of Europe have also endured unspeakable horror. So too have the nations of Africa and even South America. India, Russia, China and Australia have been victims."³⁶ He refrained from a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, even as he had a meeting with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. An article titled 'Frontline state mortified at anti-terror summit' in the Pakistani newspaper, The Nation, wrote:³⁷

Something has gone terribly wrong The popular sentiment among the majority of Pakistani media delegation was that of a total humiliation of the sole Muslim nuclear power because not only there was no mention of Islamabad's role against global terrorism but also the prime minister of the 'frontline state' was denied the opportunity to put forth its point of view. Representatives of some minion states were allowed to speak that have not even tasted a shred of the kind of carnage faced by Pakistan, which however has turned the tide on terror in an unprecedented episode of courage, commitment and sacrifice that no other participant of the 35-state summit could even think of offering for world peace.

The noxious nature of Pakistan's Afghan policy has represented a massive stumbling block on the road to a cooperative ambience between Washington and Islamabad. The Trump administration officials have publicly stated that Pakistan should become more sincere about engaging the Afghan Taliban in the Afghan reconciliation process. The American intelligence community is convinced of the presence of terror outfits in Pakistani territory as well of the material support being provided to them by Pakistan's security establishment. During a hearing on Afghanistan at the Senate Armed Services Committee, the US National Intelligence Director, Dan Coats, bluntly told that "an evaluation of how we (the USA) work with Pakistan to address the situation of the harboring of terrorist groups would be essential to a strategy that affects Afghanistan." Similarly, Vincent Stewart, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, argued before the Senate Armed Services Committee that Pakistan needs to be told very clearly that Afghanistan's security and stability is in the interest of all of the parties. He said: "We've got to convince Pakistan that if they're harboring any of the Haqqani network members that it is not in their interest to continue to host Haqqani network, that we ought to be working together to go after those 20 terrorist organizations that undermine not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but all of the region." Stewart categorically told that Pakistanis "view all of the challenges through the lens of an Indian threat to the state of Pakistan. So they hold in reserve terrorist organization-we define them as terrorist organizations, they hold them in reserve so that-if Afghanistan leans towards India, they will no longer be supportive of an idea of a stable and secure Afghanistan that could undermine Pakistan interest."³⁸

Vocal and consistent demands from the US Congress and by members of Trump's national security team have become a source of immense difficulty for the Pakistan army. A growing number of influential voices in Washington believe that Pakistan's current posture and actions in Afghanistan demand continuing vigilance. The Pentagon report of June 2017 has stated that "Afghan-oriented militant groups, including the Taliban and Haqqani network, retain freedom of action inside Pakistani territory and benefit from support from elements of the Pakistani government ... The US continues to convey to Pakistan at all levels the importance of taking action against all terrorist and extremist groups."³⁹

The Trump administration is dissatisfied with the largely hollow promises of cooperation from Pakistan, as reflected in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2018. The bill, as passed by the US House of Representatives, requires the Secretary of Defense to certify, prior to making any financial reimbursement to Pakistan, that Islamabad is maintaining security along the Ground Lines of Communication through Pakistan, taking demonstrable steps to support counter terrorism operations, disrupting cross border attacks, and countering the threat of improvised explosive devices.⁴⁰ By imposing stricter conditions for reimbursement of defense aid to Pakistan, with a caveat that Islamabad should make satisfactory progress in the fight against terrorism, the Trump administration has signaled a shift in the US approach towards Pakistan. In August 2017, the US National Security Adviser, General H R McMaster, declared that President Trump wants Pakistan to change its "paradoxical" policy of supporting terrorists. He said that Trump "has also made clear that we need to see a change in behavior of those in the region, which includes those who are providing safe haven and support bases for the Taliban, Haqqani network and others. This is Pakistan in particular that we want to really see a change in and a reduction of their support for these groups… They have fought very hard against these groups, but they've done so really only selectively."⁴¹

Indo-US Convergence
Rather than on any ideological, diplomatic, military or economic convergences with the US, Islamabad has invariably kept the broader focus of US-Pakistan relations on dynamics of Indo-Pak divergences. The Pakistan army remains obsessively preoccupied with countering India, which it considers an existential threat to the State of Pakistan. India is perceived to be using Afghanistan as a base to foment anti-Pakistan activities, particularly supporting separatists in Pakistan's Balochistan province. Afghan political leaders are also perceived to be involved in this proxy war. This perception is used as a justification by Pakistan's security establishment for relying on state-allied terrorist groups to counter India, and facilitate the creation of a 'friendly' government in Afghanistan. Due to this logic, Pakistan has found itself strongly aligned with China, whose relations with India are not friendly. Hence, Pakistan's Afghanistan policy continues to be driven by its ideological and geostrategic schizophrenia against India.

India has been involved in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan in post-Taliban era. It has spent around $2 bn since 2002 on development projects. The June 2017 Pentagon report on Afghanistan has candidly pointed out that "Pakistan views the outcome of Afghanistan to be in its vital national interest and thus remains driven by its India-centric regional policy objectives."⁴² Islamabad does not want the emergence of an Afghanistan which is friendly to India and hostile towards Pakistan. This is very problematic for the Trump administration since Washington and New Delhi are developing convergence on regional security issues, including Afghanistan.

During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's June 2017 meeting in Washington with President Trump, the Afghan issue made an important appearance. The joint press statement stated: "The increasing instability, due to terrorism, in Afghanistan is one of our common concerns. Both India and America have played an important role in rebuilding Afghanistan and ensuring its security. In order to attain our objectives for peace and stability in Afghanistan, we will maintain close consultation and communication with the US to enhance coordination between our two nations."⁴³ In coming years, India may emerge as an important player in Afghanistan with US policy change under President Trump. A trilateral security and civilian cooperation between India, Afghanistan and the US is also in the pipeline.

Conclusion
Pakistan's foreign policy has been historically shaped by the structural determinants of being a major US ally. At the peak of the Cold War, and again during the anti-Soviet "jihad" in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and more recently after 9/11, the US and Pakistan have been close allies. However, this collaboration has degenerated into mutual angry recriminations. Despite spending precious political capital and enormous financial aid, American clout in and political leverage over Pakistan remains questionable. The US and Pakistan are facing a tough time in their bilateral relations. If political reconciliation with the Taliban does not succeed, the relationship will face more challenges in the future.

Any approach focused exclusively on reconciliation cannot be pursued in isolation; a parallel effort to press Pakistan to change its current strategic behavior is a prerequisite for success on the Afghan front. Pakistan is not in a position to fix its internal problems, such as the deteriorating economic conditions and growing radicalization and Islamist extremism, without active support from the US. Pakistan must not divert the financial assistance from the US for settling old scores with Afghanistan and India. Though China is providing assistance, there can be no match between the US assistance and that of China. Pakistan must understand that the terrorist groups having got shelter in its territory have become dangerous to the existence of Pakistani state and people. Taking concrete action against these groups will not only help Pakistan establish friendly relations with the US, but also enhance its credibility at the international level. Pakistan's renewed engagement with the US would remain fragile and futile unless there is a real commitment by Islamabad to change its Afghan policy.

1. Husain Haqqani (2013), Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, Penguin.
2. President Obama's Remarks on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan", The New York Times, March 27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama-text.html. Retrieved on July 22, 2017.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Despite killing or capturing hundreds of Al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists-including major Al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi-the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries". See, "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009", available at https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ73/PLAW-111publ73.htm. Retrieved on August 2, 2017; and Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan (2009), "Aid Package From U.S. Jolts Army in Pakistan", The New York Times, October 7.
6. PTI (2009), "Obama Signs Kerry Lugar Bill", The Hindu, October 16.
7. Declan Walsh (2009), "Pakistan Paramilitary Force Routed as Taliban Militants Extend Control Towards Islamabad", The Guardian, April 24.
8. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Chicago Resident David Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies", March 18, 2010, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chicago-resident-david-coleman-headley-pleads-guilty-role-india-and-denmark-terrorism; "The American Behind the 2008 Attack on Mumbai", NPR, November 21, 2011, available at http://www.npr.org/2011/11/21/142589280/the-american-behind-the-2008-attack-on-mumbai; and Josh Shahryar (2011), "Trial and Terror: David Headley Coleman and Pakistan's ISI", The Guardian, May 16.
9. Owen L Sirrs (2017), Pakistan's Inter- Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations, pp. 267-268, Routledge, New York.
10. Ibid.
11. David Sanger (2012), Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, p. 243, Crown Publishing Group, New York.
12. For more on the debate, see Sikander Ahmed Shah (2015), International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal and Socio-Political Aspects, Routledge, New York.
13. Maha Mussadaq (2011), "US Drone Strike: Pakistan Boycotts Trilateral Meeting in Protest", The Express Tribune, March 19.
14. R M Schneiderman (2015), "Is Pakistan Really Cracking Down on Terrorism?", Newsweek, January 31.
15. Cyril Almeida (2011), "The Emperors' Clothes", Dawn, May 5.
16. Robert M Gates (2014), Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
17. Ibid.
18. Department of Defense, United States of America, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan", October 2014, available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf. Retrieved on July 27, 2017.
19. PTI (2014), "Pakistan Slams Pentagon Report on Terror Safe Havens", Economic Times, November 4.
20. Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez (2011), "Pakistan's Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy", The New York Times, September 22.
21. Ibid.
22. Matthew Green (2015), "Is Pakistan Courting Trouble in its Battle with Terrorism?", Newsweek, January 19.
23. Pakistan had launched a major army operation in the North Waziristan region in June 2014. The US had long advocated for such an operation because the region had become a hub for terror groups who attacked targets in both Pakistan and Afghanistan and a source of tension between the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
24. AP (2015), "Kerry Announces $250 Million Aid to Pakistan", The Hindu, January 13.
25. Militants Not Dangerous to Pakistan Should Not be Targeted: Sartaj", Dawn, November 18, 2014.
26. Mehreen Zahra-Malik (2015), "Pakistan Bans Haqqani Network After Security Talks with Kerry", Reuters, January 16.
27. US Asks Pakistan to Take Concrete Action Against Haqqanis", Dawn, April 24, 2016.
28. PTI (2016), "US Concerned Over Pakistan's Tolerance for Afghan Taliban Groups", The Hindustan Times, April 23.
29. Instability will Continue in Many Parts of World, Including Pakistan: Obama", The Express Tribune, January 13, 2016, available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1026624/instability-will-continue-in-many-parts-of-world-including-pakistan-obama/. Retrieved on August 3, 2017.
30. Obama Statement on Pakistan Not Ground Reality: Aziz", Pakistan Today, January 14, 2016.
31. Department of Defense, United States of America, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan", December 2016, available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Afghanistan-1225-Report-December-2016.pdf. Retrieved on July 22, 2017.
32. Michael R Gordon and Eric Schmitt (2014), "Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Will Leave Post", New York Times, July 1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/envoy-to-afghanistan-and-pakistan-will-leave-post.html. Retrieved on July 29, 2017.
33. Ashley J Tellis and Jeff Eggers (2017), "U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Changing Strategies, Preserving Gains", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 22, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/22/u.s.-policy-in-afghanistan-changing-strategies-preserving-gains-pub-70027. Retrieved on August 9, 2017.
34. Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali (2017), "U.S. 'Not Winning' in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Tells Congress", Reuters, June 13, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-idUSKBN1941Y1. Retrieved on August 7, 2017.
35. Press Information Department, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage, Government of Pakistan, "PR No. 298 PM TELEPHONES PRESIDENT-ELECT USA Islamabad: November 30, 2016", available at http://www.pid.gov.pk/?p=30445. Retrieved on July 29, 2017.
36. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Trump's Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit", May 21, 2017, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit. Retrieved on July 26, 2017.
37. Salim Bokhari (2017), "Frontline State Mortified at Anti-Terror Summit", The Nation, May 22.
38. PTI (2017), "Pakistan Harbouring Terrorists in Afghanistan, Say US Intelligence Officials", Indian Express, May 24.
39. Department of Defense, United States of America, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan", June 2017, available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf. Retrieved on July 29, 2017.
40. H.R.2810-National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018", https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2810/text#toc-H831F6FB758FD4D4EB400C4EBA0FDF3A8; also see, PTI (2017), "US House Imposes Conditions for Defence Funding to Pakistan", July 15, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/59605161.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Retrieved on July 31, 2017.
41. Anwar Iqbal (2017), "Trump Wants Pakistan's 'Paradoxical' Policies to Change: NSA", Dawn, August 6.
42. Department of Defense, United States of America, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan", June 2017, available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf. Retrieved on August 2, 2017.
43. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Modi of India in Joint Press Statement", June 26, 2017, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/26/remarks-president-trump-and-prime-minister-modi-india-joint-press. Retrieved on August 2, 2017.

Reference # 55J-2018-01-03-01